The Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) has issued a new ruling about Fx Loans in Hungary. We have asked the professor Dr. Zoltán László Kiss, hungary expert and editor of the Book Foreign currency loans? Studies, essays, polemical treatises on the ’special banking product’ to explain for FX Loans readers the case C-118/17.
1. Preface
It is contrary to the EU law if particular national legislation and laws do not allow retroactive annulment of foreign currency denominated borrowing contracts containing unfair contract terms related to exchange rate risk; the contract must be annullable if it cannot be executed without the unfair contract term – said the Third Chamber of the European Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU – hereafter: the Curia) on March 14, 2019![1]
As they stated: „Article 6 (1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that:…– it precludes national legislation which prevents, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the court seised of the casefrom granting an application for the cancellation of a loan contract on the basis of the unfair nature of a term relating to exchange rate risk where it is found that that term is unfair and that the contract cannot continue to exist without that term.”
In its judgment in Luxembourg, the Curia ruled that:
– in a law case all the national courts should examine, in the light of all the circumstances of the main proceedings, whether are there any unfair contract terms, which might cause significant inequality between the lenders and borrowers,
– a contract should be annulled if there are unfair contract terms in it, without which the contract itself cannot be executed,
– such terms do not bind consumers and, any contract which contains such unfair terms may be maintained only where it can continue to exist without the unfair terms.
In the case of ‘foreign currency loan contracts’ [more precisely: ‘foreign currency (FX) denominated borrowing’-contracts, which cover an investment-mixed, fraudulent financial investment product for exchange rate gains], there were many cleverly disguised, dishonest, unfair elements in the contracts. These contracts were sold to consumers with deceptive practices – in spite of the fact that they contradicted not only the original contractual will of the borrowers, but also many EU principles of consumer protection.
2. Historical Background
In Hungary, with a total population of less than 10 million people, almost 2 million (more precisely: a total of 1 million 960 thousand) ’foreign currency /mostly CHF-/denominated borrowing’-contracts had been concluded between 2001-2010. Of these concluded borrowing contracts approximatelly 500 thousand ’foreign currency denominated borrowing’-contracts were secured by real estate mortgages, 700 thousand contracts were contracted for motor vehicles, and 600 thousand contracts were personal borrowings for free use. About 2/5 of the total Hungarian population (approximately 4 million Hungarians) became affected directly or indirectly by the problem of ‘foreign currency denominated borrowings’.
Only two examples, just to illustrate the extreme severity of the current social problem in Hungary:
– from January 2010 to August 2017 more, than 320 thousand properties have already been auctioned. The main reason was usually that the borrowers became insolvent and the borrowings defaulted, typically because of the drastically lifted monthly payments, which were ‘justified’ by the banks with the increased exchange-rate risks (i.e. the alleged negative developments in the CHF/HUF exchange rates);
– in May 2018 900 thousand enforcement proceedings were filed by financial institutions and/or bank receivables, factor companies, as claimants against defaulted debtors in respect of claims arising from various credit, loan and financial leasing contracts. Of the 900 thousand cases, 280 thousand seem to be unrecoverable because the debtors do not have real estate or movable property that would cover the enforcement.
In 2014, more laws were introduced in Hungary to allegedly amend unfair contract terms of the banks for ‘foreign currency (FX) denominated borrowing’-contracts.
In fact, each so-called ‘FX Loan Rescue Laws’[2] served basically the same paramount goal: to keep the contracts alive at almost any cost, by arguing that it is the ’vital’, primary interest of the borrowers.
Some spectacular actions were taken to ’rescue’ the victims of the so-called ’FX Loan Trap’, e.g.:
– the text of the contracts were amended by law: the purchase price and the selling rate were removed, and the central rate of the National Bank of Hungary was entered in their place;
– ordered a ‘complete financial clearence’ for the banks, and
– ordered a ‘conversion’ of the alleged ’foreign currency loans’ to HUF at current /!/ market rates, practically for most of the borrowers despite their protests.
As a result, the laws adopted officially offered solutions to the relative smaller problems (i.e. exchange rate gaps and interest rate increases, unilaterally implemented by banks for many years).
However, the heaviest burden, all the burdens associated with exchange rate risk were left exclusively on the debtors’ shoulders, even though customers asked for at least partial share of burdens related to the exchange rate risks between the deptors, the banks and the state, due to the failures of the whole state banking supervision system between 2001-2010 and the previous original official standpoint of the politics (citing the Prime Minister, who himself announced officially in 2011 that they have many evidences that all the banks deceived the masses of consumers, when they offered with agressive marketing campaign the FX denominated borrowings to subprime costumers).
Thus, the debtors could not get rid of the trap of the ’FX denominated borrowings’ – even if the unfairness of the exchange rate risk could not be maintained, despite the interests of the debtors.
The laws also required the borrowers not to declare their contracts invalid retroactively, even if their contracts contained many unfair contract terms (such e.g. the exchange rate risk).
In spite of the debtors’ protests, laws were invoked based on the officially declared presumption that it is the sole interest of the deceived debtors to keep their contract alive. More than 144 thousand costumers submitted written complaints to their banks because of the perceived unfairness of the ’financial clearence’.
More than 40 thousand Hungarian costumers sued their banks – but none of them could win against their banks during the last ten years in front of the Hungarian Supreme Court! The common judicial practice nowadays is, as follows:
– the disputed contracts “cured” retrospectively in series,
– the judgments by the judges themselves replace the defective ones,
– up to 10 years after the contract, the judges writte back into the contract the missing elements (e.g. the amount of the borrowing in HUF, the interest rate, the installment, the APR)….- anything they want to keep the contract alive!
The judgment of the European Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-118/17 breaked this ground!
3. Novum of the Judgement of the Curia’s Judgement in Case C-118/17
Judges at the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Curia):
– have studied the case thoroughly and found that on the basis of facts and evidences that it was not in the interest of the debtors to keep their contracts at all costs,
– were aware that, on the basis of EU consumer protection principles, unfair contract points should not entail binding, negative legal consequences for consumers,
– unfair contract points have to be seen as not being there – so the banks cannot have anything to do with them, and cannot base any rights and/or claims on them.
– any unfair term must, in principle, be considered to have never existed, so that it can have no effect on consumers, who must be able to be in the same legal and factual situation in which they would have been in the absence of the term at issue
– the law must guarantee and should create a right for consumers to reimbursement of unjustified benefits wrongly obtained by the banks.
The Curia refers back to the reasoning of its previous judgments (e.g. judgement C-51/17, and substantive aspects of judgement C-26/13 and C-186/16), which emphasize that the prior information of the consumer is appropriate if the consumer can also assess the economic consequences of the exchange rate change on the basis of the pre-contractual information provided by the financial service provider.
The judgment C-51/17 states that the so called ‘FX Loan Rescue Laws’ (primarily DH 1-3 Laws) have not touched upon this issue and, despite the rules they have introduced, the unfairness of contract terms, which can be examined:
’Consequently, the answer to the first question is that the concept of ‘term which has not been individually negotiated’ in Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that it covers inter alia a contractual term amended by a mandatory national statutory provision adopted after the conclusion of a contract with a consumer, for the purpose of removing a term which is null and void from that contract.’ (see: paragraph 49. of the judgement C-51/17) [3]
The matter of the exchange rate gap and the unilateral change of contract also should be interpreted in terms ’not individually negotiated’: ’Concerning, more specifically, Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13, the Court has previously held that while that provision requires the Member States to lay down that unfair terms are not to be binding on the consumer, ‘as provided for under their national law’, the fact remains that the regulation by national law of the protection guaranteed to consumers by Directive 93/13 may not alter the scope and, therefore, the substance of that protection …’ (para 56. of the judgement C-51/17)
On the one hand, the Curia in general do not prefer the total nullity of the whole contract if they find unfair elements, which can be repaired by the courts in favour of the customers interests.
On the other hand, the Curia emphasizes in judgement C-118/17: in case of any intervention from the side of either the national legislation or the national courts the priority should be the rights and interests of the customers, and the avoidance of potential serious, unfavourable consequences for the customers:
’Moreover, it should also be noted that, although the Court accepted, in its judgment of 30 April 2014, Kásler and Káslerné Rábai (C‑26/13, EU:C:2014:282, paragraphs 83 and 84), that a national court may substitute a supplementary provision of domestic law for an unfair contractual term in order to ensure the continued existence of the contract, it follows from the Court’s case-law that that possibility is limited to cases in which the cancellation of the contract in its entirety would expose the consumer to particularly unfavourable consequences, such that the latter would be penalised…’ (para 54. of the judgement C-118/17)
The Curia calls the attention to the fact that:
- ’Under the 13th and 21st recitals of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29):… Member States should ensure that unfair terms are not used in contracts concluded with consumers by a seller or supplier and that if, nevertheless, such terms are so used, they will not bind the consumer, and the contract will continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair provisions.’ (para 3. of the judgement C-118/17)
- ’… concerning contractual terms relating to exchange rate risk, it follows from the Court’s case-law that such terms, in so far as they define the main subject matter of the loan contract, come within Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13, and escape the assessment as to whether they are unfair only in so far as the national court having jurisdiction considers, following a case-by-case examination, that they were drafted by the seller or supplier in plain intelligible language...’ (para 48. of the judgement C-118/17)
- ’If…the referring court considers that the term relating to exchange rate risk at issue in the main proceedings is not drafted in plain intelligible language for the purposes of Article 4(2), it is for it to examine whether that term is unfair and, in particular, whether, despite the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract to the detriment of the consumer at issue…’ (para 49. of the judgement C-118/17)
- ’… as regards the consequences of the potentially unfair nature of such a term, Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 requires, as was noted in paragraph 39 of the present judgment, Member States to lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms.’ (para 50. of the judgement C-118/17)
- ’In this case, as was already noted in paragraph 48 of the present judgment, the term relating to the exchange rate risk defines the main subject-matter of the contract. Therefore, in such a case, the continuation of the contract does not appear to be legally possible, which is however to be determined by the referring court.’ (para 52. of the judgement C-118/17)
The Court also calls the attention to the fact that:
a. the judicial practice (especially with regard to ’civil law unity settlement decisions’ (PJEs) issued by the Civil Chamber of the Hungarian Supreme Court) must not “deny” the EU standards related to the protection of the interests of the consumers instead of the favour of the interests of the unlawfully behaving banks and /or financial service providers. Consequently:
– the invalid condition cannot have the same legal effect as the valid one,
– it is not permissible to (mis)interpret domestic law as regards the retrospective determination of the amount of the borrowing, the determination of the repayment details and/or the determination of interest (as, for example, in Hungary, by the 1/2016 ’civil law unity settlement decision’ /PJE/), or
– the domestic law enforcer cannot say that the reason for invalidity as a complete nullity under domestic law is in fact only partial ineffectiveness (as stated in the 6/2016 ’civil law unity settlement decision’ /PJE/ regarding several paragraphs – e.g. 213.§. (1) – of the previously effective Act on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises (Hpt.)[4] .
b. Due to the principle of primacy of EU law not applicable those ’civil law unity settlement decisions’ (PJEs), which hurts the written rights and interest of the citizen costumers in favour of banks/financial service provider with keeping in effect unfair contracts, and might cause potentially serious, unfavourable consequences for the customers.
c. The replacement of any condition by a disposable provision of domestic law should aim at restoring the balance between the contracting parties (i.e. ordinary costumers vs. professionally well-informed banks) : ’In that regard, it seems to follow from the information provided by the referring court that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, in this case Paragraph 37(1) of the DH 2 Law, implies that consumers, where they invoke the unfair nature of a term other than that relating to the exchange difference or that permitting the unilateral increase of the interest rate, of costs and commissions, must also conclude that the court seised of the case declare the contract to be valid until the date of its decision. Therefore, that provision prevents, in breach of Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13, consumers from not being bound by the unfair term concerned, where appropriate, by means of the cancellation of the contract at issue in its entirety if that contract cannot continue in existence without that term.’ (para 53. of the judgement C-118/17).
d. ’In the case in the main proceedings, it is apparent from the findings made by the referring court that the continuation of the contract would be contrary to the interests of Mrs Dunai. The substitution referred to in the previous paragraph of the present judgment appears therefore not to be applicable in this case.’ (para 54. of the judgement C-118/17)
However, the consumer himself/herself is the master of the case, not the bank/financial institution or the court. According to the relevant consumer protection directive: if the consumer decides that his or her interests are more in line with the determination of total nullity and even the immediate repayment of the outstanding loan amount, then he/she has the right to choose this solution.
Furthermore, the Hungarian law also gives the court the possibility to pay the installment payment[5] in such cases, since it is the bank’s fault, and not the consumer’s responsibility that his contract is null and void.
Therefore, installment payment period maybe extended even until the end of the duration of the remaining residual maturity of the contract, as the consumer himself has undertaken to repay the loan amount and legally established interest until the end of the entire term.
Consequently, the finding of total nullity of the contract does not necessarily result in an immediate full repayment obligation to the consumer.
In addition, the loss of exchange rate risk from the contract only allows for HUF settlement, as the consumer actually received the sum of borrowing only in national currency (HUF).
There is a legally grounded right for each costumers to dispute and challenge the legality of the introduction of exchange rate risk, and this right cannot be ruled out by the law (like it happened in Hungary with the DH Laws).
Curia has not considered the Hungarian DH Laws in general totally conflicting, antagonistic to the EU Directive 93/13. Moreover, the Curia assessed that at least two problems (i.e. the unfair terms of exchange rate gap and unilateral contract amendment in the contracts) has already been solved. That is why, according to the Curia, it is not necessary any more to investigate the unfairness of those two issues int he contracts.
However, as the Curia evaluates, the issue of unfairnessness of the term of exchange rate risk can be examined in the contracts.
In addition, the Curia refers back to a previous answer given to Question 3 by Judgement C-186/16 in the order for reference, further clarified the depth of the information to be provided to consumers:’3. Article 4 (2) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that the requirement that a contractual term must be drafted in plain intelligible language requires that, in the case of loan agreements, financial institutions must provide borrowers with sufficient information to enable them to take prudent and well-informed decisions. In that connection, that requirement means that a term under which the loan must be repaid in the same foreign currency as that in which it was contracted must be understood by the consumer both at the formal and grammatical level, and also in terms of its actual effects, so that the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, would be aware both of the possibility of a rise or fall in the value of the foreign currency in which the loan was taken out, and would also be able to assess the potentially significant economic consequences of such a term with regard to his financial obligations. It is for the national court to carry out the necessary checks in that regard. Thus, as the Advocate General observed in points 66 and 67 of his Opinion, first, the borrower must be clearly informed of the fact that, in entering into a loan agreement denominated in a foreign currency, he is exposing himself to a certain foreign exchange risk which will, potentially, be difficult to bear in the event of a fall in the value of the currency in which he receives his income. Second, the seller or supplier, in this case the bank, must be required to set out the possible variations in the exchange rate and the risks inherent in taking out a loan in a foreign currency, particularly where the consumer borrower does not receive his income in that currency. Therefore, it is for the national court to check that the seller or supplier has communicated to the consumers concerned all the relevant information enabling them to assess the economic consequences of a term, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, on their financial obligations.’ [6](see paras 50, 51, operative part 2 of the Judgement C-186/16 )
That’s why it is the national courts’ obligation to examine carefully, in the light of all the circumstances of the main proceedings and, in particular, whether the banks, as financial product sellers and service providers decepted the naive costumers by misusing their objective, significantly inequal position, based on their expertise and knowledge of potential exchange rate fluctuations and foreign currency risk. significant inequality. In this respect, this requirement implies that the condition relating to exchange rate risk should be understandable to the consumer not only in terms of form and grammar, but also in terms of the specific content, in the sense that the average, well-informed, reasonably observant and circumspect consumer is not the only one. be able to recognize that the national currency may depreciate in relation to the currency in which the loan is registered, but must also be able to assess the – possibly significant – economic consequences of such a condition on its financial obligations.
In its reply to the question by the referring court, Curia states that the contract must be assessed in the light of the circumstances and conditions known at the time of its conclusion.
The Curia recalled the nature and importance of the public interest in providing protection to consumers in a vulnerable position with banks as financial service providers, which requires the national court to examine of its own motion the unfair nature of the contract term covered by Directive 93/13, thereby offsetting the unequal situation between the consumer and the bank (as seller of the special financial product and service provider).Thus, it is not for the court to maintain the unequal position of the bank as a financial service provider, but to eliminate the unequal situation for the consumer.
The Curia also draws attention to the fact that, in the public interest of the protection afforded to consumers, Article 6 of Directive 93/13 must be regarded as equivalent to national legislation, that is to say, the Directive has direct effect in that regard.
Furthermore, the Curia said it would be settled as if it had no contract: ’Nevertheless, as regards Article 6 (1) of that directive, the Court has also held that it must be interpreted as meaning that a contractual term held to be unfair must be regarded, in principle, as never having existed, so that it cannot have any effect on the consumer, and that it has the consequence of restoring the consumer to the legal and factual situation that he would have been in in the absence of that term…’ (paragraph 41 of the judgement C-118/17)
4. Summary
Based on the above, judgement C-117/17 (and previously judgement 51/17 also) fundamentally questions the decisions of the Hungarian Supreme Court (’civil law unity settlement decisions’ /PJEs/ 6/2013, 1/2016), so they are not applicable to the proceedings because the above mentioned decisions:
– contradict the cited provisions of the EU Directive 93/13,
– do not protect the interests of the mass of costumers (instead: protect the interests of the banks, as deceptive service providers of such a fraudulent , highly toxicfinancial product),
– are not suitable for restoring balance between the parties.
It has been confirmed that the courts have a duty to investigate all the points of the treaties ex officio, and should find all the possible unfair terms.
A further important element of the judgment is the possibility of litigation on the content of the ’civil law unity settlement decisions’ /PJEs/ issued by the Civil Chamber of the Hungarian Supreme Court, which should be followed mandatory by the judges of the lower level courts and result in a certain uniformity of judgments in favour of the banks against costumers.
Hungary has joined the European Union for 15 years. Before joining the EU, it undertook to enforce the principles of law and to take over the entire guiding legislation. For years, preparations and implementation of EU legislation took place. Now, however, we are holding that the courts cannot (or dare) apply EU rules on consumer protection.
The protection provided to the consumer cannot be weakened! The aim of consumer protection is not to “cure” retrospectively the wrong contracts, but to oblige banks to write fair contracts in advance.
The primary task for the future, therefore, is to build up a more robust, EU-wide prevention system, with a plausible methodology, with a pervasive sanction system against unlawfully behaving banks. Such a robust, integrated EU-wide consumer protection system, in close cooperation with strong interest groups of the civilian society and customer groups, could effectively prevent bank breaches, and might make banks aware of very serious fines and significant damages in case of any unlawful conduct.
Sources:
Judgement of the European Court of Justice of the European Union (Third Chamber) in Case C-118/17 on request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Dr.jur Péter Szepeshazy, Central District Court, Buda, Hungary), made by decision of 9 January 2017, received at the Court on 7 March 2017, in the proceedings Zsuzsanna Dunai versus ERSTE Bank Hungary Zrt, Available (Online): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62017CJ0118&from=EN (Retrieved: 15/03/2019)
Judgement of the European Court of Justice of the European Union (Second Chamber) 20 September 2018 in Case C-51/17, REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Fővárosi Ítélőtábla (Regional Court of Appeal, Budapest, Hungary), made by decision of 17 January 2017, received at the Court on 1 February 2017, in the proceedings OTP Bank Nyrt., OTP Faktoring Követeléskezelő Zrt. v Teréz Ilyés, Emil Kiss, THE COURT (Second Chamber). Available (Online): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62017CJ0051&from=EN
Judgement of the European Court of Justice of the European Union (Second Chamber) Case C‑186/16 Ruxandra Paula Andriciuc and Others v Banca Românească SA . Available (Online): http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=196568&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=14690
Devizás! Feltétlenül nézd meg! Dr.Szepesházi elmagyarázza az Európai Bíróság ítéletét. Online: https://civilkontroll.com/devizas-feltetlenul-nezd-meg-dr-szepeshazi-elmagyarazza-az-europai-birosag-iteletet/
Madari, Tibor (18/03/2019.) A C-118/17 értékelése (2019-03-18) http://hitelsikerek.hu/c-118-17-ertekelese/
Szabó, József (15/03/2019) A C-118/17 ügy tanulságai
(2019.03.15) ] http://www.hitelesmozgalom.eoldal.hu/cikkek/birosag/a-c-118-17-ugy-tanulsagai.html
[1] See: Judgement of the European Court of Justice of the European Union (Third Chamber) in Case C-118/17 on request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Dr.jur Péter Szepeshazy, Central District Court, Buda, Hungary), made by decision of 9 January 2017, received at the Court on 7 March 2017, in the proceedings Zsuzsanna Dunai versus ERSTE Bank Hungary Zrt, Available (Online): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62017CJ0118&from=EN (Retrieved: 15/03/2019)
[2] The following so-called ‘FX Loan Rescue Laws’ (DH 1-7) were issued in Hungary in 2014-2015, from which DH 1-3 Laws, issued during the year 2014 were the most important regarding our topic:
- DH1 – 2014. évi XXXVIII. törvény a Kúriának a pénzügyi intézmények fogyasztói kölcsönszerződéseire vonatkozó jogegységi határozatával kapcsolatos egyes kérdések rendezéséről. Available (Online): https://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1400038.TV
- DH2 – 2014. évi XL. törvény a Kúriának a pénzügyi intézmények fogyasztói kölcsönszerződéseire vonatkozó jogegységi határozatával kapcsolatos egyes kérdések rendezéséről szóló 2014. évi XXXVIII. törvényben rögzített elszámolás szabályairól és egyes egyéb rendelkezésekről.. Available (Online): https://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1400040.TV&txtreferer=A0000250.KOR
- DH3 – Az egyes fogyasztói kölcsönszerződések devizanemének módosulásával és a kamatszabályokkal kapcsolatos kérdések rendezéséről szóló 2014. évi LXXVII. törvény. Available (Online): https://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1400077.TV
- DH4 – A fogyasztónak nyújtott hitelről szóló 2009. évi CLXII. törvény és egyes kapcsolódó törvények módosításáról szóló 2014. évi LXXVIII. törvény. Available (Online):https://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0900162.TV
- DH5 – 2015. évi II. törvény a pénzügyi intézmények fogyasztói kölcsönszerződéseivel összefüggő, valamint egyéb magánjogi tárgyú törvények módosításárólhttps://mkogy.jogtar.hu/?page=show&docid=a1500002.TV
- DH6 – 2015. évi LII. törvény a banki elszámolás során tapasztalt visszaélések elleni fellépéshez szükséges törvények módosításáról. Available (Online): https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/?page=show&docid=a1500052.TV
- DH7 – 2015. évi 145. törvény – az egyes fogyasztói kölcsönszerződésekből eredő követelések forintra átváltásával kapcsolatos kérdések rendezéséről. Available (Online): https://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1500145.TV
[3] Judgement of the European Court of Justice of the European Union (Second Chamber) 20 September 2018 in Case C-51/17, REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Fővárosi Ítélőtábla (Regional Court of Appeal, Budapest, Hungary), made by decision of 17 January 2017, received at the Court on 1 February 2017, in the proceedings OTP Bank Nyrt., OTP Faktoring Követeléskezelő Zrt. v Teréz Ilyés, Emil Kiss, THE COURT (Second Chamber). Available (Online): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62017CJ0051&from=EN
[4] A hitelintézetekről és a pénzügyi vállalkozásokról szóló 1996. évi CXII. törvény /Hpt./ . Available (Online) : http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/t9600112.htm/t9600112_0.htm
[5] See, for example:
- 1952. évi III. törvény a polgári perrendtartásról (régi Pp.): r. Pp. 217.§. (2) és (3) bekezdés,
- 2016. évi CXXX törvény a polgári perrendtartásról (új Pp.): új Pp. 344.§. (2), (3) bekezdés).
[6] See: Judgement of the European Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C‑186/16 Ruxandra Paula Andriciuc and Others v Banca Românească SA . Available (Online): http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=196568&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=14690
